By Robert Wilkinson
The President of the Family Division has issued updating guidance in respect of the duration of ex-parte orders in the Family Court. The Guidance can be found here, but is also summarised below.
“The relevant principles, compliance with which is essential, are as follows:
(i) An ex parte (without notice) injunctive order must never be made without limit of time. There must be a fixed end date. It is not sufficient merely to specify a return day. The order must specify on its face and in clear terms precisely when it expires (eg, 12 noon on 20 March 2017).
(ii) The order must also fix a return day. The order must specify the date, time and place of the hearing on the return day. The return day should normally be no more than 14 days after the date when the order was made. How long the hearing on the return day should be listed for must be a matter for the discretion of the judge. However, having regard to paragraph 6, often a very short listing may well be appropriate.
(iii) Careful consideration needs to be given to the duration of any order made ex parte (without notice). Many orders will be of short duration, typically no more than 14 days. But in appropriate cases involving personal protection, such as non‐molestation injunctions granted in accordance with Part IV of the Family Law Act 1996, the order itself can be for a longer period, such as 6 or even 12 months, provided that the order specifies a return day within no more than 14 days. This must be a matter for the discretion of the judge, but a period longer than 6 months is likely to be appropriate only where the allegation is of long term abuse or where some other good reason is shown. Conversely, a period shorter than 6 months may be appropriate in a case where there appears to be a one‐off problem that may subside in weeks rather than months.
(iv) The order must make it clear that (a) it was made in the absence of the respondent and that the court has considered only the evidence of the applicant and (b) the court has made no finding of fact. Where the evidence is written, it must be identified in the order. Where, exceptionally, the court has received oral or other evidence (eg, a photograph) that evidence should be recorded on the face of the order or reduced to writing and served with the order.
(v) Where the order has been made in accordance with Part IV of the Family Law Act 1996 it must recite that the court has had regard to sections 45(1) and (2) of the Act.
(vi) The order (see FPR 18.10(3)) ‘must contain a statement of the right to make an application to set aside or vary the order under rule 18.11.’ The phrase ‘liberty to apply’ is not sufficient for this purpose. The order must spell out that the respondent is entitled, without waiting for the return day, to apply to set aside or vary the order.
(vii) If the respondent does apply to set aside or vary the order the court must list the application as a matter of urgency, within a matter of days at most.
6 Experience suggests that in certain types of case, for example, non‐molestation or other orders granted in accordance with Part IV of the Family Law Act 1996, the respondent frequently neither applies to set aside or vary the order nor attends the hearing on the return day.
(i) When, in such cases, there is no attendance by the respondent and the order, having been served, does not require amendment there is no need for re‐service. The order made on the return should however record that the respondent, although afforded the opportunity to be heard, has neither attended nor sought to be heard.
(ii) If, however, variation of the original order is sought by the applicant (eg by extending the ambit or the duration of the order) then:
(a) Paragraphs 5(i), (iii)‐(v) must be complied with in relation to the new order and the new order will need to be served.
(b) Unless, before the return day, the respondent was given proper notice of the proposed amendments, either in the application or in the initial order, (a) the new order must specify a new return day, and (b) paragraph 5(ii) must be complied with in relation to the new order.
7 I remind all practitioners and judges of the principle, which applies to all ex parte (without notice) injunctive orders made by the Family Court or by the Family Division, irrespective of the subjectmatter of the proceedings or the terms of the order, that a without notice application will normally be appropriate only if:
(a) there is an emergency or other great urgency, so that it is impossible to give any notice, however short or informal, or
(b) there is a real risk that, if alerted to what is proposed, if ‘tipped off’, the respondent will take steps in advance of the hearing to thwart the court’s order or otherwise to defeat the ends of justice. In an appropriate case this can justify the grant of a non‐molestation injunction without notice, lest the respondent, having been served with an application, further molests his (or her) victim or exerts pressure on her (him) to abandon the proceedings.”
Related Posts
Extension of Supervision Orders
I was recently instructed on behalf of parents in an application by a Local Authority to extend a supervision order. The twelve-month supervision order was nearing its expiry, and owing to a decline in the standard of care being offered to the children, the Local Authority wished to continue its engagement and work with the family for a further year.
The Evolution of the Human Rights Claim in Part IV Proceedings
In the course of the past two years, claims under the Human Rights Act 1998 (‘HRA 1998’) have become a regular consideration for practitioners involved in section 31 Children Act proceedings. Pre 2015 there was very little in the way of domestic case law and as such the only guidance at the time was from Strasbourg.